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Recent heterogeneous-firm models of international trade suggest that productivity determines whether 
firms engage in export and foreign direct investment. However in practice, m Abstract any productive 
firms are not internationalized, whereas many unproductive firms are. This situation suggests that factors 
other than productivity influence internationalization. 
This study examines a set of potential factors –personal characteristics of the chief executive officer 
(CEO)– using a unique panel dataset for Japanese small and medium enterprises (SMEs). We find that 
SMEs are more likely to be internationalized when the CEO is more risk-tolerant, forward-looking, and 
internationally experienced. 
These factors show significant statistical relationships with SMEs’ decisions to internationalize, perhaps 
suggesting why productive firms might not internationalize. 
In addition, we find that productivity has no significant relationship with the decision of exiting 
international markets probably because initial costs of internationalization become sunk, whereas SMEs 
with internationally experienced CEOs show strongly less likelihood of exit. These empirical results are 
consistent with theoretical predictions of our model that incorporates the uncertainty of foreign markets 
into the trade theory with firm heterogeneity. 
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The body of theoretical and empirical studies regarding international trade has grown sub-
stantially. Among theoretical literature, Melitz (2003) develops a heterogeneous-ﬁrm model
of trade, indicating that only productive ﬁrms can aﬀord initial costs of export and hence
can export. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) extend the analysis by incorporating for-
eign direct investment (FDI), suggesting that because of larger initial costs of FDI, FDI
ﬁrms are the most productive, exporters are second-most, and ﬁrms serving only domestic
markets are the least productive. Numerous empirical studies using ﬁrm-level data generally
conﬁrmed the predictions of Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004).1
Although existing empirical studies illuminate the role of productivity in determining
internationalization of ﬁrms, they also ﬁnd that the eﬀect of productivity is often small.
For example, applying ordinary least squares estimation of a linear probability model of ex-
port decisions to U.S. plant-level data, Bernard and Jensen (2004) ﬁnd that a 100-percent
increase in total factor productivity (TFP) raises the probability of exporting by only 1.7
percentage points. Bernard and Wagner (2001) ﬁnd similar-sized eﬀects of labor produc-
tivity on export decisions using German data. Todo (2011) using ﬁrm-level data for Japan
ﬁnds a negligible eﬀect of productivity: a 50-percent increase in productivity raises the
probability of engaging in export or FDI by than 0.1 percentage points. Greenaway and
Kneller (2004) point out that, for UK ﬁrms, ﬁrm characteristics including productivity are
“quantitatively far less important than experience” (p. 361).
In summary, productive ﬁrms might not export or engage in FDI, whereas unproductive
ﬁrms might perform either or both. This situation can be observed in Figure 1, which
reﬂects ﬁrm-level data for Japanese small and medium enterprises (SMEs) explained in
detail later. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the log of labor productivity for two types
of Japanese SME: those serving only the domestic market (domestic-only ﬁrms), and those
engaging in export, FDI, or oﬀshoring of production processes (internationalized ﬁrms).
On average, domestic-only ﬁrms are less productive than internationalized ﬁrms, but the
distributions of the two types of ﬁrm overlaps with each other to a large extent. Bernard,
1These studies include Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) for Columbia, Mexico, and Morocco; Bernard
and Jensen (1999, 2004) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) for the United States; Head
and Ries (2003), Tomiura (2007), and Todo (2011) for Japan; Barrios, G¨ org, and Strobl (2003) for Spain,
Greenaway and Kneller (2004) for the UK, Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) for various EU countries; Damijan,
Polanec, and Prasnikar (2007) for Slovenia; and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008) for France. Useful
surveys can be found in Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007), Greenaway and Kneller (2007), and
Wagner (2007).
2Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003, Figure 2A) and Mayer and Ottaviano (2007, Figure 4)
show that this is the case for U.S. and Belgian ﬁrms, respectively. Todo (2011, Figure 1)
conﬁrms this ﬁnding using Japanese data for larger ﬁrms.
In addition, empirical studies reveal that unobserved ﬁrm characteristics largely aﬀect
ﬁrms’ decision to internationalize. Todo (2011) ﬁnds that a change of one standard de-
viation in a ﬁrm’s unobserved characteristics raises the probability of internationalization
by 30 percentage points. Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008) also ﬁnd a sizable eﬀect of
unobserved ﬁrm characteristics in France, using a simulation approach. However, none of
these studies reveals what those unobserved ﬁrm characteristics are.
This study takes advantage of a unique dataset for Japanese SMEs to examine the eﬀects
of factors that have been treated as unobserved ﬁrm characteristics. In particular, we focus
on characteristics of the chief executive oﬃcer (CEO) of each SME, such as his/her risk and
time preference and overseas experience.
Our theoretical model integrates heterogeneous-ﬁrm models of trade developed by Melitz
(2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) and those of investment under uncertainty
developed by Dixit (1989) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) to incorporate uncertainty in
foreign markets. The model predicts that ﬁrms are more likely to be internationalized when
the CEO is less risk averse or less myopic, and when he has studied, worked, or lived abroad.
Probit estimations using ﬁrm-level data for Japanese SMEs, in which possible endo-
geneity biases are carefully controlled for, support these theoretical predictions. In fact,
the eﬀect of the CEO’s risk and time preference and international experience are large in
magnitude. In addition, we ﬁnd that productivity has no eﬀect on ﬁrms’ decision of exiting
export markets. These ﬁndings suggest why productive ﬁrms might not be internationalized
and why unproductive ﬁrms might be.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model
that generates empirical predictions. Section 3 shows the estimation method based on the
theory. Section 4 describes data used in the estimation. Section 5 presents estimation
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
To obtain empirical predictions concerning ﬁrms’ decisions to enter and exit foreign markets,
we incorporate uncertainty in foreign markets into a standard trade model with heteroge-
3neous ﬁrms ` a la Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), closely following
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Dixit (1989). For simplicity, we regard exporting and FDI as
the same internationalization activity and assume that both require identical costs and gen-
erate identical proﬁts. The term “export” hereafter in this section is equivalent to exporting
and FDI.
2.1 Set-up
Consider monopolistically competitive ﬁrms that can potentially export to foreign markets.
Demand in foreign markets is uncertain. Firms incur a lump-sum investment fx to initiate
export.2 In addition, exporting requires a per-period ﬁxed cost f. Thus, ﬁrm i earns a
per-period proﬁt λitφi − f from exporting, where λit captures ﬁrm-speciﬁc idiosyncratic
shocks to foreign demand and φi captures the time-invariant ﬁrm characteristics, partic-
ularly representing ﬁrm i’s productivity.3 Exporting ﬁrms can decide to suspend exports
(exit from the foreign market) without any costs, although they must incur the entry cost
fx again should it decide to reenter at some future time.4
Based on Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Dixit (1989), we incorporate uncertainty in the
foreign market by assuming that the index of the foreign market size λit follows a geometric
Brownian motion:
dλi = μλidt + σλidz, (1)
where μ denotes the drift parameter, σ the variance parameter, and dz a standard Wiener
process with E[dz]=0a n dE[(dz)2]=dt.5
The ﬁrm’s decision problem has two state variables: the current shock λi and a discrete
variable that indicates whether the ﬁrm exports (I =1 )o rn o t( I = 0). In state (λ,0),
the ﬁrm decides whether to remain a non-exporter (a domestic-only ﬁrm) or to export.
Likewise, in state (λ,1), it decides whether to continue exporting or to exit the foreign
market. The net instantaneous export proﬁt for ﬁrm i in time t depends on its status on
2The speciﬁcation of ﬁrms’ incurring ﬁxed costs for export is quite common in the recent ﬁrm-
heterogeneity literature in international trade, such as Melitz (2003). We can interpret the ﬁxed cost f
as a cost for maintaining sales networks in the foreign market and the ﬁxed cost fx as a cost for redesigning
products according to the foreign market’s special requirements, for example.
3To obtain this speciﬁcation, we actually suppose that ﬁrm i faces an iso-elastic demand of q = Ap−θ
in the foreign market. The ﬁrm follows the standard markup pricing rule and the gross proﬁt from the
foreign market is given by A
θ [τc
α ]1−θϕθ−1
i where α ≡ (θ − 1)/θ ∈ (0,1), c is the input price, τ>1i s
an iceberg-type transportation cost, and ϕi is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity. We assume that only A is
stochastically variable. Hence, deﬁning λ ≡ A
θ [τc
α ]1−θ and without loss of generality, we take λ itself as the
stochastic variable. ϕθ−1
i is also redeﬁned as φi
4Thus, exiting from the foreign market is costly even if there is no explicit cost for suspending exports.
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where ρ is the risk-adjusted subjective discount rate indicating the return rate that ﬁrms
require from risky assets (including their own risky export revenues). More speciﬁcally, ρ
is given by
ρ = r + (risk adjustment), (3)
where r is the rate of return on the risk-free asset. For example, equation (3) implies that
if ﬁrms are risk-neutral, the risk-adjustment term becomes zero and the subjective discount
rate equals the risk-free return rate r. As ﬁrms become more risk-averse, they require higher
returns from risky assets and hence ρ rises. As will be shown shortly, we use the standard
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to specify the risk-adjustment term.
We explicitly include the risk-adjustment term in the subjective discount rate, because
we will estimate the impact of ﬁrms’ risk and time preferences on internationalization,
exploiting information collected from CEOs of SMEs. However, in our theoretical framework
given by equations (2) and (3), a large ρ indicates that ﬁrms are more risk-averse, while it
can also indicate that ﬁrms are more myopic. We lack suﬃcient freedom to deal with risk
aversion and time preferences separately,6 although we use separate variables for both in
the empirical analysis.
2.2 Entry and Exit Decisions
In what follows, we drop subscripts i and t for notational brevity unless it causes confusion.
Let V0(λ,φ) be the expected present value of starting with a shock λ in the non-exporting
state and following optimal policies when the ﬁrm’s eﬃciency parameter is φ. V1(λ,φ)c a n
be similarly deﬁned for the exporting state. The solution consists of these functions and
the rules for optimally switching between states 0 and 1.
When the ﬁrm does not export, there is no operating proﬁt from the foreign market.
The only return to being a domestic-only ﬁrm is the expected capital gain, since the value
6Such restriction can be relaxed in non-expected utility frameworks studied in Epstein and Zin (1989)
and Weil (1990).
5V0(λ,φ) changes with λ. The value of being a domestic-only ﬁrm can be expressed by
V0(λ,φ)=E[e−ρdtV0(λ + dλ,φ)]. (4)
Expanding the right-hand side (RHS) using Ito’s lemma, rearranging slightly, and taking





V   
0 (λ,φ). (5)
This equation implies that the expected return rate on the asset V0(λ,φ) equals the ﬁrm’s
subjective discount rate, ρ.7
The expected present value of an exporting ﬁrm, V1(λ,φ), can be similarly derived. The
only diﬀerence is that the exporter earns an instantaneous proﬁt λφ − f. The diﬀerential
equation for V1(λ,φ) is given by
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1 (λ,φ). (6)











where A1, A2, β1 > 1, and β2 < 0 are constant. The derivation of equations (7) and (8) is
standard and relegated to the Appendix.
We now consider the transition from a domestic-only ﬁrm to an exporter and vice versa.
For each ﬁrm, there exists a threshold λ1 above which it starts to export, such that
V1(λ1,φ) − V0(λ1,φ)=fx. (9)
7Ito’s lemma gives the diﬀerential dV0 as
dV0 = V  
0(λ)dλ +( 1 /2)V   
0 (λ)(dλ)2
=[ μλV  
0(λ)+( 1 /2)(σλ)2V   
0 (λ)]dt + σλV  
0(λ)dz,
where (1) is substituted into dλ and (dλ)2. The per-period ﬂow of the expected capital gain is
E[dV0]=[ μλV  
0(λ)+( 1 /2)(σλ)2V   
0 (λ)]dt.
Thus, expanding the RHS of (4), we obtain
V0(λ)=( 1− ρdt)V0(λ)+[ μλV  
0(λ)+( 1 /2)(σλ)2V   
0 (λ)]dt + o(dt),
where o(dt) collects the terms that approach zero faster than dt. The derivation of (5) is immediate.
6Likewise, for each ﬁrm, there exists a threshold λ0 above which ﬁrms keep exporting and
below which ﬁrms quit exporting, such that
V1(λ0,φ) − V0(λ0,φ)=0 . (10)
We also have smooth pasting conditions as follows:
V  
1(λs,φ)=V  
0(λs,φ),s =0 ,1. (11)
Applying the functional forms of V0 and V1 in equations (7) and (8) to the two threshold
conditions in (9) and (10) and the two smooth pasting conditions in (11), we have four
equations for solving four unknowns A1,A 2,λ 1(φ), and λ0(φ) for given φ.
2.3 Empirical Predictions
The simple model above generates several intuitive predictions about ﬁrms’ entry and exit.
Most results are studied in Dixit (1989) except for those related to ﬁrm heterogeneity in
productivity φ. Thus, rather than the derivations of those predictions, we focus on the
intuitions of those predictions and the interpretations in our estimations.8
First, from equations (7)-(11), we notice that λ1φ and λ0φ are constants and independent
of the productivity parameter φ. This implies that more-productive ﬁrms have a lower
trigger value of λ for both entering and exiting foreign markets. In other words, productive
ﬁrms are more likely to serve foreign markets and less likely to exit, because proﬁts from
foreign markets are larger. This is a standard result obtained from heterogeneous-ﬁrm
models of trade, such as Melitz (2003).
Second, the trigger value for entering foreign markets, λ1, is greater than that for exit-
ing, λ0. Thus, once having entered foreign markets, ﬁrms tend to remain unless they face
a large decline in foreign demand. This result indicates hysteresis in internationalization
of ﬁrms, predicting that incumbent internationalized ﬁrms are more likely to remain inter-
nationalized. In the empirical estimation, we control for this hysteresis by including the
previous export intensity for each ﬁrm.
Third, the distance between λ1 and λ0 is shorter for more-productive ﬁrms, since λ1φ−
λ0φ = C, where C is a constant such that λ1−λ0 = C/φ. The trigger values for entries and
exits are decreasing in the productivity measure, but the trigger value for entries declines
8Some basic results can be analytically derived, but many other results cannot since equations (9), (10),
and (11) are highly nonlinear. Numerical solutions are common for performing comparative statics.
7more substantially as productivity rises. Therefore, productivity aﬀects entering foreign
markets more than it aﬀects exiting.
Fourth, the entry cost fx is related to the gap between λ1 and λ0, as an increase in
entry cost fx raises λ1 and lowers λ0. One determinant of entry cost is the ﬁrm’s knowledge
of foreign markets. We assume that this knowledge can be enhanced by experience with
the foreign country. Another determinant of entry cost is the level of workers’ education,
since educated workers can learn foreign markets more easily. Therefore, we hypothesize
that workers’ international experience and education level raise the likelihood that SMEs
will internationalize.
Fifth and most important, the ﬁrm’s subjective discount rate, ρ, positively aﬀects the
trigger value for entry. Thus, ﬁrms are less likely to enter foreign markets when their
discount rate is high. To further clarify the relationship between ρ and the degree of risk
aversion, we employ the result of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), in which risk
adjustment is given by multiplying the total amount of risk by the price of risk, and rewrite
equation (3) as:
ρ = r +
cov(dV0/V0,r m)
var(rm)
[¯ rm − r], (12)
where rm is the rate of return on the market portfolio and ¯ rm is its average. Deﬁning
ξ ≡
cov(dz/V0,rm)
var(rm) [¯ rm − r] and substituting equation (12) into the diﬀerential equation (5),
the option value of export can be expressed in terms of the rate of return of the risk-free
asset r such that




V   
0 (λ,φ). (13)
Assuming that V0 and the market portfolio are positively correlated, ξ>0, the above
diﬀerential equation implies that the expected rate of return on the risky assets should
be lower than the rate of return on the risk-free asset. The value of V1 is analogous to
V0, substituting ρ and μ in (6) with r and μ − σξ, respectively. Accordingly, highly risk-
averse ﬁrms are more readily deterred from exporting and more easily encouraged to quit
exporting. As explained earlier, our theoretical framework cannot distinguish between the
degree of risk aversion and the discount rate. Therefore, we expect that myopic ﬁrms are
less likely to enter foreign markets. In our estimation, we use data on CEOs’ risk and time
preferences to test these hypotheses.
83 Estimation Method
To test the predictions provided in the previous section, we employ a probit model. Let us
ﬁrst deﬁne the diﬀerence in the long-term proﬁt between the domestic and the exporting
states: y∗
i ≡ V1(λ,φ)−V0(λ,φ)−fx.F i r mi is internationalized (yi =1 )i fy∗
i ≥ 0, and not
internationalized (yi =0 )i fy∗
i < 0. On the basis of our theoretical arguments, we assume
that y∗
i is determined by a set of explanatory variables Zi including productivity, ﬁrm size,
workers’ educational level, and indicators for risk and time preferences, and international
experience of the CEO:
y∗
i = Z 
iθ + ui, (14)
where ui is a normally distributed error. To control for industry and regional heterogeneity,
Zi includes industry and region dummies.
One econometric issue in this probit estimation is that some determinants of internation-
alization are endogenous. For example, although productivity may determine international-
ization, it can be improved by internationalization, as the literature frequently demonstrates
(see Kimura and Kiyota, 2006 in the case of Japan). If so, using current productivity as a
determinant of internationalization may generate a biased estimate of the eﬀect of produc-
tivity on internationalization. Firm size also causes endogeneity if internationalized ﬁrms
grow faster. To avoid these endogeneity problems, we use lagged productivity and ﬁrm size,
rather than their current values, as independent variables.
Workers’ education level, measured by the share of college graduates in total employ-
ment, may also be endogenous, since ﬁrms willing to be internationalized are more likely
to employ educated workers. Since the dataset in this study includes the current share of
college graduates but not the lagged share, we estimate equation (14) together with another
equation,
educi = x 
iβ + νi, (15)
using a full information maximum likelihood (FIML) method, where educ is the share of
college graduates. We assume that ν and u are normally distributed jointly. The set of
potential determinants of educ includes the determinants of internationalization of ﬁrms,
Zi as well as an additional instrument, past wages per worker in logs.
Besides the determinants of internationalization, we also examine the determinants of
dis-internationalization, i.e., how exits from foreign markets are determined. In particular,
9this study focuses on exits from export markets, rather than those from FDI or oﬀshoring,
because of data constraints, using a similar FIML approach. In this estimation, we assume
an equation like (14) where a previous exporter i stops exporting, or ˜ yi =1 ,i f˜ y∗
i ≡
−(V1(λ,φ) − V0(λ,φ)) ≥ 0, and is still exporting, or ˜ yi =0 ,i f˜ y∗
i < 0. Factors that
determine exiting export markets are similar to those that determine internationalization:
productivity, ﬁrm size, characteristics of the CEO, and industry dummies. However, unlike
the previous estimation, here we use current productivity and ﬁrm size as determinants and
instrument them by their previous values. To obtain convergence in the FIML estimation,
we drop workers’ education, a possible endogenous variable, from the set of independent
variables.
4D a t a
4.1 Construction of the dataset
Our data are taken from two micro-level data sets. The ﬁrst is based on a conﬁdential
survey on “Internationalization and Enterprise Activities” (Kokusaika to Kigyo Katsudo
ni Kansuru Anketo Chosa, hereafter called “the survey on internationalization”) to SMEs
conducted by Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting in cooperation with the Small and
Medium Enterprise Agency under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of
Japan in December, 2009. The survey deﬁnes SMEs as ﬁrms with less than 300 employees
or less than 300 million yen of paid-up capital, following the deﬁnition of the Small and
Medium Enterprise Agency. This deﬁnition pertains throughout this paper.
The target of the survey was selected by the following stratiﬁed-sampling method. First,
SMEs engaging in export or FDI were identiﬁed using METI’s Current Survey of Production
(Kogyo Tokei Chosa, hereafter CSP) and Current Survey of Commerce (Shogyo Tokei Chosa,
CSC), Toyo Keizai’s Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran (Data Bank for Internationalized En-
terprises), and conﬁdential enterprise data from Japan External Trade Organization. These
internationalized SMEs number about 8,000, and all are targeted by the survey. Second,
among domestic-only ﬁrms identiﬁed in METI’s CSP and CSC, about 10,000 were randomly
selected for the survey. Firm-level questionnaires were sent to 18,407 ﬁrms; 3,512, or 19.1
percent, responded.
Data from the survey on internationalization include characteristics of CEOs, explained
in the next subsection, and more customary variables such as sales, proﬁts, the number of
10workers, the share of workers with college degrees, and the year of establishment. Whether
the ﬁrm engaged in export, FDI, and/or oﬀshoring of any production process in 2009 is also
reported.
We merge the dataset based on the survey on internationalization with another dataset
based on the CSP in order to utilize ﬁrm characteristics in earlier years. Conducted annually
by METI, CSP covers all enterprises producing manufactured goods or mineral products at
the establishment level. Response to CSP is compulsory, and the number of establishments
exceeds 100,000 in each year. Although CSP is conducted at the establishment level, ﬁrm-
level data can be aggregated using an identiﬁcation code for each ﬁrm. Thus, data from CSP
include standard ﬁrm-level variables which can be used to construct measures of productivity
as well as the share of exports in total sales. However, no data on FDI or oﬀshoring are
available in CSP. This study uses the ﬁrm-level data from CSP for 2006 or the latest year
available at the time of data collection in 2009.
The number of ﬁrms included in both data sets from the survey on internationalization
and CSP is 2,167. We dropped 171 service sector ﬁrms from the sample, because we focus
on manufacturing and 655 ﬁrms because they lack data necessary for this analysis. Our
sample totals 1,341 ﬁrms.
4.2 Characteristics of CEOs
The survey on internationalization oﬀers information rarely available in other ﬁrm-level
data sets. First, it questioned the CEO of each ﬁrm about international experience: “Have
you studied, worked, or lived abroad?” Since CEOs of Japanese SMEs are unlikely to study,
live, or work abroad during their term, we assume that the response indicates international
experience before appointment as CEO and hence prior to the decision of internationalizing
the ﬁrm. A related question concerns international experience of the ﬁrm’s other work-
ers: “Has any worker studied, worked, or lived abroad?” However, since ﬁrms willing to
be internationalized are more likely to employ workers with international experience, this
indicator may be endogenous and will be dropped in some speciﬁcations in our estimation.
From the theoretical argument in Section 2, we expect that international experience of the
CEO and other workers lowers the initial cost of internationalization, particularly costs of
marketing and understanding business rules and laws, and thus raises the probability of
internationalization.
Second, the survey asked about CEOs’ risk preferences: “If there were an investment
11opportunity that presents a 50-percent probability of earning 1 million yen and otherwise
earning nothing, what is the most you would pay for this investment?” There are 10
available choices spanned from 1 million yen to 100,000 yen plus the option “I would not
even pay less than 100,000 yen for this.” From the responses, we constructed a variable for
risk preference that takes one if the CEO chose not to invest, two if 100,000 yen, three if
200,000, four if 300,000, ﬁve if 400,000, and six if 500,000 or more. A larger value for this
variable implies that the CEO is more risk-tolerant. Since our theoretical model predicts
that risk-averse ﬁrms are less likely to be internationalized, we expect that this variable for
risk-taking attitude has a positive impact on internationalization.
Finally, a question inquired into CEOs’ time preferences: “What is the minimum amount
which you would prefer receiving one year and one month from now to receiving 100,000 yen
one month from now?” There are 15 available choices from 102,000 yen, 104,000, 106,000
to more than 130,000 plus the response “In any case, I would prefer receiving 100,000 yen
one month from now.” Since about half the sampled CEOs chose the ﬁnal response (“In
any case, ...”), we constructed a binary variable that takes zero if the CEO chose it and one
otherwise. We presume that this variable approximates whether the CEO is forward-looking
(one) or myopic (zero).
Estimating risk and time preferences from hypothetical questions is standard in the
literature, although it has not been done in the context of internationalization of ﬁrms.
Cramer, Hartog, Jonker, and Van Praag (2002) use a similar question about risk aversion
in a survey in the Netherlands and ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of risk aversion on entrepreneurship.
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) review many empirical studies estimating
time preference. A better approach to estimate risk and time preferences than hypothet-
ical questions is to perform experiments in which individuals actually receive a monetary
reward. For example, Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010) carried out such experiments
in Vietnam to estimate both risk and time preferences. However, these experiments are
mostly performed in less developed countries probably because the monetary reward can be
small in these countries. Such experiments are almost impossible for our purposes, since a
large reward would be necessary to estimate risk and time preferences of CEOs, relatively
rich individuals.
124.3 Summary statistics
In this paper, internationalized ﬁrms are deﬁned as ﬁrms engaging in export, FDI, or oﬀ-
shoring of any production process. Among the 1,341 ﬁrms in the sample, 612 (46 percent),
188 (14 percent), and 206 (15 percent) are engaged in export, FDI, and oﬀ-shoring, respec-
tively. Accordingly, 707 ﬁrms or 53 percent of all sampled ﬁrms are internationalized. The
high share of internationalization arises from our sampling strategy and does not reﬂect
actual share of internationalized ﬁrms among all SMEs. Using CSP data, we identify 528
ﬁrms (39 percent) as exporters in 2006. Among them, 63 ﬁrms stopped exporting during
the period 2007-2009, while 147 ﬁrms started exporting during that period.
The productivity measure used in this paper is value added per worker, deﬁned as sales
minus intermediate inputs divided by the number of workers. Although TFP may be a better
measure of productivity, reliable data on the real value of capital stock are unavailable.
When we compute productivity measures from the survey of internationalization in some
speciﬁcations, we rely on sales per worker because of lack of survey data on intermediate
inputs.
The upper and the lower panels of Figure 1 show the distribution of value added per
worker in 2006 in logs for domestic-only and internationalized ﬁrms, respectively. Although
internationalized ﬁrms are more productive on average, the productivity distributions for
the two types of ﬁrm overlap signiﬁcantly, as found in existing studies such as Bernard,
Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003, Figure 2A); Mayer and Ottaviano (2007, Figure 4); and
Todo (2011, Figure 1). This ﬁgure roughly suggests that productivity is a driving factor in
internationalization, but that there likely are many other important factors.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables used in this study. The mean of
the number of workers and value added per worker in 2006 are 61 and 11 million yen,
respectively. However, the standard deviation of these variables is quite large, indicating
that sampled SMEs vary substantially in their characteristics.
The last two columns of Table 1 show the diﬀerence in the mean between internation-
alized and domestic-only ﬁrms. The average of the log of value added per worker in 2006
is 2.00 for domestic-only ﬁrms and 2.28 for internationalized ﬁrms, supporting the ﬁnding
from Figure 1 that internationalized ﬁrms are more productive on average. In addition,
internationalized ﬁrms are more likely to employ educated workers, to be risk-tolerant and
forward-looking, and to have international experience, while there is no systematic diﬀer-
13ence between the two types of ﬁrm in the log of the number of workers. In the next section,
we will formally test whether these factors aﬀect internationalization of ﬁrms.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Determinants of internationalization
To estimate the factors determining internationalization, we used FIML estimation using
equation (14) and (15) in Section 3. We also performed simple probit estimation of equation
(14) for reference. The probit results are presented in column (1) of Table 2 and the results
obtained from the FIML estimation are in column (2). In columns (3) and (4), we drop
the indicator for workers’ international experience and focus on the indicator for the CEO’s
international experience, since the former is more likely to be endogenous, as explained in
Section 4. In each column, the upper and lower rows, respectively, indicate the estimates
of the coeﬃcients and the marginal eﬀect at means.
In all results, productivity measured by the log of value added per worker in 2006 had a
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on internationalization in 2009. The eﬀect of productivity is
large: at means, an increase in the log of productivity by one unit or a 100-percent increase
in productivity raises the probability of internationalization by 9-12 percentage points. The
eﬀect of internationalization experience measured by share of exports in total sales in 2006
is also positive and signiﬁcant. These results are standard in the literature.
Surprisingly, the ﬁrm size measured by the log of the number of employees has no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on internationalization, although a positive eﬀect is found in the literature.
Perhaps this is because we focus on SMEs and the variation in ﬁrm size is small in our
sample. In other words, although large ﬁrms outside our sample are more likely to engage in
export or FDI than our sampled SMEs, their size does not aﬀect SMEs’ decisions regarding
export or FDI.
CEOs’ characteristics not examined in previous studies, i.e., risk preference, time pref-
erence, and international experience, show a positive, statistically signiﬁcant, and econom-
ically large eﬀect. According to the FIML results in columns (2) and (4) of Table 2, if the
CEO’s preference changes from most risk-averse to most risk-taking, that is, if the indicator
for risk preference changes from 1 to 6, the probability that the ﬁrm is internationalized
increases by 10 percentage points. If a myopic CEO becomes forward-looking, that is, if
the indicator for time preference changes from 0 to 1, the probability would increase by
146-7 percentage points. If the CEO had studied, lived, or worked abroad, the probability of
internationalization would be about 12 and 19 percentage points higher in columns (2) and
(4), respectively. If other workers have international experience, the increase in probabil-
ity increases by 23 percentage points. These ﬁndings suggest that the risk tolerance, time
preferences, and international experience of the CEO and other workers largely determine
the ﬁrm’s decision to internationalize.
The share of college graduates among workers has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect in
the probit estimations but not in the FIML estimations. The diﬀerence between the two
types of estimation suggests that ﬁrms employ more educated workers to export and FDI,
although employing educated workers does not lead the ﬁrm to export or FDI. Finally, years
in business has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect. This ﬁnding suggests that old ﬁrms are
more likely to be internationalized, implying that internationalization requires experience.
5.2 Psychological eﬀect of the CEO’s characteristics
Having found new evidence that CEOs’ characteristics and experiences substantially inﬂu-
ence SMEs’ internationalization, we further examine how these characteristics psychologi-
cally aﬀect decision on internationalization. To do so, we ask a question to domestic-only
ﬁrms: “Why isn’t your ﬁrm not internationalized?” Of the 634 sampled domestic-only ﬁrms,
42 percent answered “We do not think our ﬁrm needs to be internationalized.” The propor-
tion is high, compared with that of the ﬁrms answering ”lack of knowledge” (23 percent),
”lack of credit” (15 percent), and ”lack of human capital” (17 percent) as reasons.9
To investigate how this psychological unwillingness to be internationalized is determined,
we perform a probit estimation in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable for
choosing “no need” as a reason not to internationalize. The results in Table 3 indicate
that ﬁrms feel less willing to internationalize when the CEO is more risk-averse or has
less international experience or when the ﬁrm is larger. Interestingly, productivity has no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on psychological unwillingness. Looking at the marginal eﬀect shown in the
lower rows of Table 3, we ﬁnd that the CEO’s risk preference and international experience
have large eﬀects. In short, even when productivity is high, ﬁrms may be unwilling to
internationalize if the CEO is risk-averse or has no international experience. These results
combined with those in Section 5.1 show that personal characteristics of an SMEs CEO
erect psychological barriers for entering foreign markets.
9Multiple choices are allowed for this question.
155.3 Determinants of exit from export markets
Along with the factors determining internationalization, we are also interested in dis-
internationalization. We focus on conditions under which previous exporters stop exporting,
since data limitations prevent examining determinants of exit from FDI or oﬀshoring. Ta-
ble 4 presents results from a simple probit model using the lagged productivity and ﬁrm
size and from the FIML model in Section 3. As in Section 5.1, we use the indicator of
international experience of other workers in columns (1) and (2) but drop it in (3) and (4)
to avoid endogeneity.
The results show that when the CEO has studied, worked, or lived abroad, exporting
ﬁrms are 5-7 percentage points less likely to stop exporting. Other workers’ international
experience shows a similar eﬀect, as does the share of exports in total sales, indicating that
ﬁrms engaged in exporting are less likely to stop exporting.
By contrast, productivity has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on exits, implying that even unpro-
ductive ﬁrms remain in export markets. This is probably because after entry, initial costs
of export become sunk and unproductive ﬁrms have no reason to exit export markets. This
ﬁnding explains why unproductive ﬁrms might be internationalized (Figure 1). However,
it remains puzzling that productivity has no signiﬁcant eﬀect at all, rather than having a
small eﬀect. Perhaps other factors neutralize productivity in the decision to exit export
markets, but data limitations prevent the investigation of this issue.
The results in Table 4 also indicate that the CEO’s risk tolerance and time preference
have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on exiting export markets, although these preferences are signif-
icant for entering foreign markets (Table 2). These contrasting results also highlight the
importance of sunk costs on entering and exiting foreign markets. The CEO’s risk and
time preferences aﬀect the entry decision but not the exit decision after initial costs become
sunk.
6 Conclusion
This paper has investigated factors inﬂuencing the internationalization of Japanese SMEs
(engaging in export and FDI). Recent heterogeneous-ﬁrm models of international trade sug-
gest that productivity determines internationalization (Melitz, 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and
Yeaple, 2004). However, the distribution of productivity for internationalized and domestic-
only ﬁrms is often found to overlap signiﬁcantly (Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum, 2003;
16Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007; and Todo, 2011), indicating that many productive ﬁrms are
not internationalized, whereas many unproductive ﬁrms are. Studies such as Eaton, Kor-
tum, and Kramarz (2008) and Todo (2011) indicate that unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity is a
major determinant of internationalization, but these studies do not explain what actually ac-
counts for the unobserved heterogeneity. Using a unique panel dataset for Japanese SMEs,
we found that ﬁrms are more likely to be internationalized when the CEO is more risk-
tolerant, forward-looking, and internationally experienced. We also found that the CEO’s
risk aversion and lack of international experience promote psychological unwillingness to
be internationalized regardless of the ﬁrm’s productivity. These personal characteristics of
the CEO have large eﬀects, perhaps explaining why productive ﬁrms might not be inter-
nationalized. In addition, we found that productivity has no signiﬁcant relationship with
the decision of exiting foreign markets, while the size of previous exports and the CEO’s
international experience have negative and signiﬁcant relationships. The evidence suggests
that initial export costs become sunk costs, and hence, even unproductive ﬁrms do not exit
export markets, explaining why unproductive ﬁrms are internationalized. These empirical
results coincide with the predictions of our theoretical model incorporating uncertainty in
foreign markets into heterogeneous-ﬁrm trade models.
This paper alleviated possible estimation biases to the extent possible, but several po-
tentially remain. Although we treat CEOs’ personal characteristics as exogenous, they may
be endogenous. A CEO’s risk tolerance and time preference may change after evaluating
previous decisions including those to internationalize. Moreover, although we assume that
CEOs acquired international experience before their decisions regarding internationaliza-
tion, their experiences may have been aﬀected by the ﬁrm’s internationalization. Therefore,
there may be reverse causality from the ﬁrms internationalization to the CEO’s character-
istics. Second, our estimations are based on panel data of ﬁrms for which data are available
for 2006 as well as 2009. We had to drop ﬁrms that exited the market from 2007 to 2009.
This may have caused attrition biases. However, data limitation prevents correcting for
these possible biases.
17A Computation of Diﬀerential Equations
The second-order homogenous diﬀerential equation in (5) is linear in the dependent variable
V0 and its derivatives. This equation has the general solution
V0(λ,φ)=A1(λφ)β1 + A2(λφ)β2, (A.1)
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By assumption, μ<ρ . The quadratic equation of the left-hand side of (A.2) takes the value
2(μ − ρ)/σ2 < 0a tβ = 1 and the minimum value at β =( 1 /2) − μ/σ2 < (1/2). Therefore,
β1 > 1a n dβ2 < 0.
Since when λ is very small, the option to export is virtually worthless, which implies
that A2 = 0 (we abandon the negative root β2). Thus, the solution of V0(λ,φ)c a nb e
expressed by
V0(λ,φ)=A1(λφ)β1. (A.5)
The diﬀerential equation in (6), rewritten below for reference, is non-homogenous:
σ2λ2
2
V   
1 (λ,φ)+μλV  
1(λ,φ) − ρV1(λ,φ)=f − λφ. (A.6)
Since the RHS is the ﬁrst order of λ, we try to ﬁnd a particular solution of the form
V1(λ)=Aλ + B. Since V   
1 =0a n dV  
1 = A, the diﬀerential equation (A.6) becomes
μλA − ρ(Aλ + B)=f − λφ. (A.7)
Equating coeﬃcients, we obtain A = φ/(ρ−μ)a n dB = −f/ρ. Therefore, abusing notations
slightly, the general solution of V1 c a nb ee x p r e s s e db y
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Number of 








Dummy for internationalization  1341  0.53  0.50  0  1 
Share of exports in total sales in 2006 (%)  1341  5.75  14.65  0.51  10.45 
Value added per worker in 2006 (million yen)  1341  11.01  14.66  9.16  12.67 
  ---  (in  logs)  1341  2.15  0.68  2.00  2.28 
Number of workers in 2006  1341  60.87  62.82  55.50  65.68 
  ---  (in  logs)  1341  3.72  0.89  3.72  3.71 
Years of operation  1341  52.15  33.95  49.03  54.95 
Share of college graduates in total workers 1341  17.81  17.23  12.53  22.55 
Index of risk preference (1-6, 6 = risk taking)  1341  3.24  2.25  2.95  3.49 
Index of time preference (0-1, 0 = myopic)  1341  0.50  0.50  0.47  0.53 
President's overseas experience (0-1)  1341  0.27  0.45  0.15  0.39 
Workers' overseas experience (0-1)  1341  0.16  0.36  0.09  0.21 
Sales per worker (million yen)  1291  77.49  1040.83  121.32  39.07 
  ---  (in  logs)  1291  2.87  1.05  2.76  2.97 
Number of workers  1337  59.28  64.23  52.07  65.74 
  ---  (in  logs)  1337  3.65  0.96  3.63  3.67 
 
Notes: Variables for 2006 are taken from the Current Survey of Production, while other variables are taken from 
the survey on "Internationalization and Enterprise Activities" conducted in 2009. 
 
  25 
 
Table 2: Determinants of Internationalization of firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Probit FIML Probit FIML 
Coefficient        
Share of college graduates  0.0141*** 0.000775  0.0148***  -0.00274 
 (0.00259)  (0.0227)  (0.00259)  (0.0209) 
Risk preference (1-6, 6 = risk taking)  0.0520*** 0.0544*** 0.0499***  0.0525***
  (0.0141) (0.0153) (0.0141) (0.0156) 
Time preference (0-1, 0 = myopic) 0.137* 0.155* 0.153** 0.175** 
  (0.0746) (0.0852) (0.0689) (0.0747) 
President's overseas experience (0-1)  0.282**  0.331**  0.443***  0.510*** 
  (0.138) (0.154) (0.137) (0.142) 
Workers' overseas experience (0-1)  0.617***  0.638***     
 (0.155)  (0.140)     
Years of operation  0.00505*** 0.00529*** 0.00501***  0.00528***
  (0.00148) (0.00170) (0.00144) (0.00159) 
Ratio of exports to total sales in 2006  0.0598**  0.0602**  0.0594**  0.0596** 
  (0.0282) (0.0278) (0.0288) (0.0281) 
Value added per worker in 2006 (log)  0.238***  0.286***  0.257***  0.319*** 
  (0.0735) (0.0748) (0.0753) (0.0763) 
Number of workers in 2006 (log)  -0.0596  -0.0542  -0.0115  -0.00164 
  (0.0516) (0.0538) (0.0480) (0.0496) 
Marginal  effect      
Share of college graduates  0.00548*** 0.000300  0.00575***  -0.00107 
  (0.00103) (0.00881) (0.00104) (0.00812) 
Risk preference (1-6, 6 = risk taking)  0.0202*** 0.0211*** 0.0194***  0.0204***
  (0.00566) (0.00619) (0.00570) (0.00635) 
Time preference (0-1, 0 = myopic)  0.0531*  0.0599*  0.0593**  0.0681** 
  (0.0285) (0.0328) (0.0263) (0.0286) 
President's overseas experience (0-1)  0.106**  0.123**  0.163***  0.186*** 
  (0.0495) (0.0551) (0.0462) (0.0475) 
Workers' overseas experience (0-1)  0.221***  0.228***     
 (0.0509)  (0.0454)     
Years of operation  0.00195*** 0.00205*** 0.00195***  0.00205***
 (0.000564) (0.000655) (0.000550)  (0.000614) 
Ratio of exports to total sales in 2006  0.0231**  0.0233**  0.0231**  0.0232** 
  (0.0104) (0.0102) (0.0106) (0.0104) 
Value added per worker in 2006 (log)  0.0922*** 0.111***  0.0999***  0.124*** 
  (0.0294) (0.0307) (0.0302) (0.0314) 
Number of workers in 2006 (log)  -0.0231  -0.0210  -0.00446  -0.000637 
  (0.0201) (0.0209) (0.0187) (0.0193) 
Observations 1341  1341  1341  1341 
Log likelihood ratio  -670.1  -6193  -684.5  -6210 
Notes: The dependent variable is whether the firm is internationalized (=1) or not (=0). A firm is defined as being 
internationalized if it exports, has an affiliate in a foreign country, or offshores part of its production processes. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, 
respectively. Industry and region dummies are included, but the results are not shown for brevity.   
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Table 3: Determinants of Unwillingness to Internationalize 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 Probit  Probit 
Coefficient    
Risk preference (1-6, 6 = risk taking)  -0.0791*** -0.0806*** 
 (0.0232)  (0.0234) 
Time preference (0-1, 0 = myopic)  -0.109  -0.106 
 (0.0804)  (0.0823) 
President's overseas experience (0-1)  -0.221*  -0.312** 
 (0.130)  (0.139) 
Workers' overseas experience (0-1)  -0.385*   
 (0.226)   
Year of establishment  -0.00130  -0.00124 
 (0.00214)  (0.00218) 
Value added per worker in 2006 (log)  -0.0342  -0.0475 
 (0.0824)  (0.0812) 
Number of workers in 2006 (log)  0.105*  0.0966* 
 (0.0581)  (0.0568) 
Marginal effect     
Risk preference (1-6, 6 = risk taking)  -0.0310*** -0.0316*** 
 (0.00908)  (0.00917) 
Time preference (0-1, 0 = myopic)  -0.0425  -0.0414 
 (0.0314)  (0.0321) 
President's overseas experience (0-1)  -0.0847*  -0.118** 
 (0.0482)  (0.0500) 
Workers' overseas experience (0-1)  -0.144*   
 (0.0785)   
Year of establishment  -0.000511 -0.000488 
 (0.000840) (0.000853) 
Value added per worker in 2006 (log)  -0.0134  -0.0186 
 (0.0323)  (0.0318) 
Number of workers in 2006 (log)  0.0412*  0.0379* 
 (0.0228)  (0.0223) 
Observations 723  723 
Log likelihood ratio  -456.1  -457.9 
Notes: This table is based on a probit model in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the firm stated "The firm does not need to be internationalized" and zero otherwise. Marginal effects at means, 
not coefficients, are shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, respectively. Industry and region dummies are included, but the 
results are not shown for brevity. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Exits from Exporting 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Probit FIML Probit FIML 
Coefficient      
Risk preference (1-6, 6 = risk taking)  0.00908  -0.000437  0.0176  0.00596 
  (0.0338) (0.0341) (0.0332) (0.0338) 
Time preference (0-1, 0 = myopic)  -0.186 -0.116 -0.199 -0.138 
  (0.151) (0.153) (0.149) (0.152) 
President's overseas experience (0-1)  -0.275 -0.337 -0.404**  -0.451** 
  (0.208) (0.212) (0.201) (0.203) 
Other worker's overseas experience (0-1)  -0.554***  -0.473**     
 (0.200)  (0.200)     
Years  of  operation  -0.00257 -0.00242 -0.00266 -0.00233 
  (0.00231) (0.00222) (0.00232) (0.00219) 
Ratio of exports to total sales in 2006  -0.0189*** -0.0172*** -0.0188***  -0.0174***
  (0.00549) (0.00560) (0.00535) (0.00503) 
Value added per worker in 2006 (log)  -0.148    -0.115   
 (0.125)    (0.122)   
Number of workers in 2006 (log)  0.0195    -0.0209   
 (0.0748)    (0.0722)   
Sales per worker (log)    -0.291    -0.229 
   (0.212)    (0.157) 
Number of workers (log)    0.00594    -0.0324 
   (0.0735)    (0.0696) 
Marginal effect      
Risk preference (1-6, 6 = risk taking)  0.00150  -7.68e-05  0.00304  0.00106 
  (0.00557) (0.00599) (0.00575) (0.00604) 
Time preference (0-1, 0 = myopic)  -0.0308  -0.0205  -0.0346  -0.0248 
  (0.0252) (0.0271) (0.0261) (0.0274) 
President's overseas experience (0-1) -0.0407  -0.0522*  -0.0599**  -0.0682***
  (0.0273) (0.0287) (0.0250) (0.0255) 
Other worker's overseas experience (0-1)  -0.0781*** -0.0727***    
 (0.0235)  (0.0264)     
Years  of  operation  -0.000423 -0.000425 -0.000459 -0.000416 
  (0.000379) (0.000395) (0.000398) (0.000393) 
Ratio of exports to total sales in 2006  -0.00312*** -0.00301*** -0.00325*** -0.00310***
  (0.000826) (0.000879) (0.000847) (0.000814) 
Value added per worker in 2006 (log)  -0.0244    -0.0199   
 (0.0205)    (0.0209)   
Number of workers in 2006 (log)  0.00321    -0.00362   
 (0.0123)    (0.0125)   
Sales per worker (log)    -0.0510    -0.0410 
   (0.0408)    (0.0301) 
Number of workers (log)    0.00104    -0.00579 
   (0.0129)    (0.0124) 
Observations  584 556 584 556 
Log likelihood ratio  -192.9  -1145  -197.1  -1149 
Notes: The dependent variable is whether the firm stopped exporting (=1) or is still exporting (=0). Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent 
level, respectively. The sample consists of firms that reported a positive share of exports in total sales in 2006. 
Industry and region dummies are included, but the results are not shown for brevity. 
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